Corporate Liquidation: abrdn European Logistics Income $ASLI

This is not an investment advice, make your own research before investing

I discover this opportunity through the Liquidation Stocks Substack, which I highly recommend (check his Substack and X account).

I also suggest reading the analysis by Real Assets Value, which covers real estate valuation better than I do. My focus is mainly on balance sheet valuation and my thoughts on the quality of the lease clients and properties.

abrd European Logistics Income is an investment trust that focuses on acquiring and managing logistics properties.

Due to liquidity issues and the company consistently trading at a discount from its Net Asset Value (NAV), the board and management decided to liquidate the trust after a strategic review. This was announced on May 20, 2024, in a press release.

We know that the company invests in high-quality logistics properties with reliable tenants and inflation-linked contracts.

According to the 2024 Annual Report, the company’s property portfolio includes:

Here is the history of properties sold by the company:

  • March 2024: A warehouse in Meung, France, sold for €17.5 million (matching its book value).
  • January 2025: A property in Oss, Netherlands, sold for €15.7 million (1.9% above its 2023 book value).
  • January 2025: Two properties in Spain (Coslada, Madrid, and Barcelona) sold for €29.7 million (11% above their Q3 2024 valuation).

In May 2025, the company announced (in its latest unaudited NAV update) that five assets are under offer. After repaying the debt, the proceeds will be distributed to shareholders.

Historically, the company has sold properties at or above their book value, often with a premium. I am confident this trend will continue.

According to the May 2025 unaudited NAV update:


At the current exchange rate of €0.845 = £0.71, with the share price at 59.40 GBX, there is a potential upside of approximately 19%.

Real Asset Value estimated the liquidation timeline to be 12–18 months, while Liquidation Stocks predicted 2 years. I believe it will be closer to 2 years, which suggests an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of about 9.09% (quite good).

I opened a position in this special situation at 57.60 GBX.

Lionsgate Studio – Spin-off

Not investment advice – Just educational and informational – Make your research before investing

Introduction to the Operation

This is a spin-off where the following are separated:

  • Lionsgate Studios Corp
  • Starz

The operation will be like this:

  • For each common share of the holding company Lions Gate Entertainment Corp (LGF.B), you get 1 share of Lionsgate Studios Corp and 1 share of Starz.
  • For each preferred share of the holding company (LGF.A), you get 1.12 shares of Lionsgate Studios Corp and 1 share of Starz.

In this case, one of the spin-offs, Lionsgate Studios Corp (ticker $LION), had already started trading on May 17, 2024. LGF owns 87% of the shares, and the rest are free-floating.

Company history

Usually, I start explaining which company is, but for this case, I thought it was interesting to talk about the operation first, before the company. This way, it’s clear from now on that when I mention Lionsgate Studios and Starz, I’m talking about two (eventual) separate companies.

Lions Gate Entertainment was officially formed in 1997. It includes very famous films and sagas like John Wick, Saw, Hunger Games, and many others. The company (like the rest of the industry) had problems in recent years because of protests by writers and actors in 2023.

Starz was bought in 2016 for 4.4 billion dollars. It provides premium digital content (series and movies) based on subscriptions. This is offered directly and through distributors, including OTT providers (like Amazon, Apple, etc.) and MVPDs (Comcast, Charter, DirecTV, etc.). As of March 31, 2024, it had 21.8 million active subscribers. It is mainly aimed at women.

Numbers of the Spin-Off

Obviously, since this is a media company (the same happens if you analyze Canal+, Vivendi’s spin-off), it has very high depreciation and amortization (D&A) expenses in the income statement, which strongly affects its accounting profit.

I don’t want to dive too deep into whether it’s a good company or not, or justify if it could be a good investment by analyzing how it generated Y amount of free cash flow over X years, and so on. Personally, this is a sector where I wouldn’t invest, for a simple reason: the high D&A costs tell you something there are big investments in capital expenditures (CAPEX) required. Maybe one year you have a blockbuster film that brings in a lot of cash, but other years you’re just burning money.

Of course, I’ll give a little overview of the holding company and its segments because I need to do this to test my theory that one of these spin-offs is potentially extremely undervalued (plus, there’s an additional situation that could happen, like a possible sale, but that’s speculating too much).

Let me clarify first that the prospectus for this spin-off is a mess it seems almost intentionally disorganized.

With all the disorganization, I decided to use LTM pro-forma data (Full Year March 31, 2024 + 9 months ending December 31, 2024 – 9 months ending December 31, 2023) so that it includes the eOne acquisition. It also fits pretty well with what the company has reported in previous years and what’s been discussed in meetings.

The valuation will be based on EV/EBITDA for simplicity. First, because of the high charges in depreciation, amortization, and impairments that this type of company has (and also because they decided to take some extra impairments to get rid of goodwill).

As we can see, we have an EV/EBITDA of 9x for Lionsgate Studios, which is very similar to what the company published as its current valuation in the December 2023 presentation. However, historically, M&A deals in this sector have happened at a much higher multiple.

Here we see first that, very likely, the spin-off of Starz will help improve the potential valuation of Lionsgate Studios.

And what about Starz? Why do we have so many unknowns? For the simple reason that the company isn’t trading yet. But we can still find a value with a simple subtraction. We take the share price of the holding company and subtract the current value of the Lionsgate Studios share ($LION), and that gives us the value the market would be assigning to Starz, right?

Well, if we consider that the holding company has two types of shares trading, $LGF.A and $LGF.B, with different conversion rates, let’s do the calculations.

For simplicity, we’ll start with $LGF.B, where the conversion ratio is 1:1.

We see that using the common shares ($LGF.B), we get a share price of $0.28 and a market cap of $70 million. This means an EV/EBITDA of 5x (I won’t get into whether that’s low or high yet).

Now, let’s use $LGF.A, where the conversion ratio is 1:1.12.

Negative price? Yes, obviously, if we assume a static price for $LION. But in theory, we are getting Starz share for free and with a decent safety margin to buy it cheaper than $LGF.B. Arbitrage traders, take note!! One way to ensure we really get the Starz share for free is to short $LION for the same amount at the same time. However, in IBKR, it shows as not shortable (and, in fact, it already has quite a bit of short interest).

I wrote about this opportunity on Sunday, March 30, 2025, when in the pre-market the preferred share ($LGF.A) was down 3.6. This opportunity has since disappeared, so the numbers mentioned earlier are no longer valid. But it remains as an exercise for anyone if this opportunity comes up again before the spin-off.

Now, is it better to start a position now or wait until the spin-off is official? We could use one part of the money to take advantage of the arbitrage now and another part to buy more shares in the days after, because:

  • It’s a low-capitalization company, so many funds or indices that include the holding company’s stock will sell it off => selling pressure.
  • It’s a bad company (yes) and not well-known, and the proof is the arbitrage gap in this well-announced spin-off, which makes me think most shareholders of the holding company will quickly get rid of these shares => selling pressure.

This last part might not happen, but I find it strange if it doesn’t, considering what I’ve said before.

Starz Valuation

As we know, Starz was bought in 2016 for 4.4 billion, which equals 10x EV/EBITDA. Since the company lost almost half its margin (but it should improve after the spin-off), valuing it at 6x to 8x EV/EBITDA seems reasonable to me. Even though it’s a bad company, it still has 20 million subscribers and steady income.

In other words, we have potential upside, and for me, it’s not too optimistic to think the company could have an EV of 1 billion to 1.2 billion, considering it was bought for 4.4 billion 9 years ago.

Additional Operations in the Spin-Off

I want to highlight some important news that might explain one of the reasons for this spin-off (besides improving Lionsgate’s valuation): it prepares the company to be sold.

Here’s a fact: we have the Liberty Strategic Capital fund, led by Steven T. Mnuchin, who was the Treasury Secretary during Donald Trump’s previous presidency. This is a big signal because the fund is likely either waiting for or planning to push for a sale, especially since the Trump administration is expected to be more friendly to these kinds of corporate deals.

Another activist fund that owns shares in Lionsgate has also been pushing for the company to be sold.

So, a possible sale of Lionsgate is on the table, and if it happens at an average valuation of 15x EV/EBITDA, it would be around 14 dollars per share.

Conclusion

This is a very interesting operation, the type that Joel Greenblatt talks about in his book.

I want to make clear that, at the time of writing this post, I don’t have any open positions in the company because the potential gain from buying shares at a negative price didn’t happen due to timing. I’ll keep tracking the company’s stock price and wait to see if another arbitrage opportunity comes up. If it does, I might buy coverage to lock in that price (by shorting $LION).

We can wait for Starz to start trading and expect a likely sell-off, then buy the shares at a bargain price and sell them as soon as they reach a price we think is reasonable. I don’t think it’s a good company to hold long-term.

Another option is to buy $LION shares (if we don’t own holding company shares) and wait for a very likely sale. The issue with this is how long it might take to find a potential buyer.

US Masters Residential Property Fund – Liquidation overview

I found this case on the Special Situation Investments website, which I really recommend. It’s great for anyone interested in special situation ideas, and it’s amazing as educational content if you’re into this topic.

Today, I want to talk about the US Masters Residential Property Fund. It’s a real estate investment trust (REIT) managed externally, listed in Australia, but owning properties in the USA.

A bit of history: In March 2022, the company announced a deal to sell itself at a low price (0.22 AUD per share, compared to its value of 0.68 AUD per share). A fund called Raper Capital wrote a letter to the management, complaining about how bad the deal was. (You should read the letter—it’s really interesting!) Then, in April 2022, because of rising interest rates and inflation, the buyer canceled the deal. After that, the company decided to voluntarily liquidate meaning it would close down and sell everything. They also turned preferred stock into ordinary shares in 2023, an idea Raper Capital had suggested in their letter.

So, let’s dive into the numbers in detail (based on the 2024FY last report):

The first table shows the company’s Net Asset Value, or NAV, which is the total value of its assets minus its debts. The company has properties worth 710 million AUD, plus cash of 83.372 million AUD. After subtracting its debts (liabilities) of 411.238 million AUD, the NAV is 382.994 million AUD. The company has 708 million shares, and the current share price is 0.40 AUD.

The second table gives two estimates for 2028, when the company plans to finish selling all its properties. I made some assumptions based:

  • Discount on selling price compared to book value: The properties are listed at their market price in the company balance sheet. But according to the company’s press releases, they usually sell properties at a price between -2% and +2% of the book value (on average). I used a 1% discount for the normal estimate and a -1% discount (meaning a small gain) for the optimistic estimate.
  • Transaction costs: These are the costs of selling the properties, like fees for agents or legal paperwork. On average, this is 5% of the sale price, but I used 2.5% for the optimistic estimate. I got this information from the company’s press releases.
  • 2028 deadline: This is the estimated year when all properties will be sold.

To keep things simple for this activity, I didn’t include some future costs, like:

  • Management fees: The company is managed by two external companies, Brookville and Pinnacle. Their fees can change every year based on inflation (CPI), but I left this out for now.
  • Taxes: The company changed from being a REIT to a US corporate structure, so it now has to pay federal and state taxes. However, it can use past losses to lower its taxes, which reduced its tax bill from 40 million AUD to 3 million AUD. I didn’t include taxes in my calculations.
  • CAPEX: The company needs to spend money to maintain its properties so they don’t lose value. This will continue until the last property is sold, but I didn’t include these costs here.

Based on my estimates, the distributable NAV (what shareholders might get) could be between 360.014 million AUD (normal case) and 377.249 million AUD (optimistic case). This means a distribution of 0.51 AUD per share in the normal case, or 0.53 AUD per share in the optimistic case.

Compared to the current share price of 0.40 AUD, this could mean a gain of 27.12% to 33.21% for shareholders, which sounds nice. But there’s a problem: this gain will take a long time—at least 3 years. During that time, you might miss other opportunities to make money elsewhere, which is called the “cost of opportunity.” Also, I didn’t include one important thing that could speed things up: the company is doing a share buyback, which means it’s buying back its own shares. This can increase the share price, but it also means the company will have less cash available in the future, and I didn’t consider that in my calculations.

In my opinion, at this price and time, it doesn’t look like a great deal. But it might be worth keeping on our watchlist. We can follow the liquidation process and see what happens. Maybe the company will announce a major distribution, or the stock price might drop a lot, which could make it more interesting to buy later.

Not investment advice!

A bargain in a spin-off: Havas NV

This is my first special situation position! And I wrote this at 15 December but I decide to publish today as my first post in this blog.

Why Vivendi SE split their divisions?

Vivendi decided to spin off three divisions, including Havas NV, with two main goals:

  • Unlock potential: Let each division spread its wings and fly (or at least try to).
  • Improve valuation: Sometimes, the sum of the parts is worth more than the whole.
Vivendi structure after spin-off
Vivendi structure after spin-off

Havas NV (my focus)

Havas NV started trading on December 16, 2024, and while the market’s initial reaction was a big sell-of (commonly on the spin-off), I think there’s more to this story. Let’s dig in.

Founded in 1835 in Paris, Havas is one of the largest marketing and communications groups in the world in terms of revenue. It currently has more than 23,000 employees.

They have three division on Havas:

  • Havas Creative: Advertising, branding, digital transformation and social media
  • Havas Media: Division responsible for optimizing advertising investment through the use of data.
  • Havas Health: Division responsible of communication and advertising of health sector.

At first glance, Havas NV might not seem like the most exciting company to own. But here’s the thing: it’s a stable, cash-generating business with minimal CAPEX requirements. And at this price, it’s looking like a bargain.

The company has done a great job in a stable sector over the last 3 years:

  • Revenue: +7% annually
  • Net Income: +10% annually
  • EBIT: +9% annually
  • Cash Conversion Rate (CCR): 89% (that’s almost every euro of profit turning into cash!)

Low level of debt in balance BUT they have an off-balance debt of 300 millions how they expose in their spin-off prospectus

Valuation

The stock started trading at €1.80 but quickly fell to €1.45. At this price, Havas NV looks cheap. But is it too cheap? Let’s look at it:

Metric2024E
EBITDA447M
FCF236M
EPS0,19
Shares Outstading991M
Net Debt448M
Share Price1,45
Market Cap1436M
Enterprise Value1884M

Using this we get the following valuations:

MetricValue
EV/EBITDA~4x
MC/FCF~6x
PER~7x

If we compared this valuation metric to similar companies:

ComapanyEV/EBITDAMC/FCFPERMarket Cap
Publicis Groupe SA~8x~13x~11x25B
Omnicon Group~8x~10x~10x16B
Interpublic Group of Companies~8x~10x~10x14B
Havas~4x~6x~7x1.4B

We can see that at this price the company looks a bit cheap, and I think it is because of the sales force of a spin-off, a not-known company and the factor of being a small/mid cap.

Valuing the company with some reasonable multiples (with a discount of 20% from similar companies because it’s smaller) and including their dividend policy of 40% of net income attributable to the group (rounding to 4% dividend yield) that they put in the prospectus, we get:

MultiploIntrinsic ValueUpside from 1.45
EV/EBITDA6x2,251%
MC/FCF8x1,9131.72%
PER8x1,549%

Using these multiples (with a 20% discount because Havas NV is smaller than its peers), the company looks undervalued.

Havas NV is a stable, cash-generating business with a proven track record. It’s not the funniest stock out there, but sometimes the boring ones are the most profitable. Plus, at this price, the downside seems limited, and the upside? Well, let’s just say I’m optimistic.

I started with a small of 3.5% in my portfolio. Just dipping my toes in before diving in. If Havas NV performs as I expect, I will add more over time.

I do not hold a position with the issuer such as employment, directorship, or consultancy.
I hold a material investment in the issuer’s securities.